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ABSTRACT 
This study contains an application of psychosocial theories to the process of 
radicalization among Muslim militants (jihadis) with a history of activity in the United 
States. Drawing extensively from De la Corte‘s seven psychosocial principles of 
terrorism, the study codes each principle into a corresponding example from case studies 
of American jihadism. The end result is the use of theory to create a new empirical and 
psychosocial perspective into homegrown jihadism. The application of De la Corte‘s 
theory is also used as a framework to suggest frameworks for detection, intervention, and 
interdiction when it comes to homegrown jihadi activity. 
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Terrorism, particularly what is now known as jihadi terrorism, has become a 
persistent and deadly problem for many of the world‘s nations and peoples. Since rising 
to prominence as a form of political violence in the 1970s, terrorism has mutated into a 
major threat to nation-states and individuals alike. Particularly after the 9/11 terror 
attacks in the United States, there has been a great deal of scholarly interest in generating 
theories of terrorism. Such work addresses important gaps in the previous scholarship of 
terrorism, which, from the 1970s to the 1990s, is best described as patchy. 
One of the main conclusions that a number of scholars (Bjorgo, 2005; De la 
Corte, 2007; Gerges, 2005, 2006; & Pape, 2006) have reached is that terrorism can be 
explained as a psychosocial phenomenon. This explanation is a convincing one, for a 
number of reasons. First, it matches the data that terrorism is the result of personal 
pathology. Second, it also models the impact of cultural variables on the individual 
psyches of terrorists. By encompassing processes from the brain of the terrorist to the 
structure of his or her culture and society, the psychosocial theory of terrorism offers a 
rich explanatory framework for researchers, law enforcement personnel, and policy-
makers alike. The psychosocial theory is also broad enough to encompass the insights of 
other forms of explanatory theories of terrorism, as will be demonstrated in this study. 
In De la Corte‘s (2007) influential formulation of the psychosocial theory of 
terrorism, psychosocial factors are applied to what might be called the post-commitment 
stages; in other words, this theory applies to terrorism in the execution stages. Therefore, 
one of the gaps in the psychosocial theory is that it does not account for the pre-execution 
stages of terrorism—that is, all the processes that predate the moment of the actual terror 
attack. For example, psychosocial theories of terrorism have not been widely applied to 
the radicalization phase of terrorism, during which an ordinary person becomes, through 
a series of psychological and social processes, into a terrorist or potential terrorist.  
De la Corte‘s (2007) psychosocial theory, which was designed to account for 
terrorism in its active stage, can also be repurposed to better model and understand 
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radicalization from a psychosocial perspective. In particular, De la Corte‘s first, second, 
third, fifth, and sixth principles can be applied to radicalization. This paper contains 
precisely such an application of De la Corte‘s theory to a body of data gathered from 
primary and secondary accounts of radicalization in the United States, with a special 
focus on Islamist—also known as jihadist—terrorism (Neumann & Smith, 2007). The 
goal is to apply an existing theory of terrorism to coding an empirical body of case 
studies of domestic terrorism. This goal is an apt one for research because, despite the 
widespread use and popularity of the psychosocial theory of terrorism, it has not been 
used as a unitary framework from which to code multiple individual incidents of 
jihadism, especially jihadism carried out within the United States. The existing 
applications of psychosocial theory (such as those of Gerges, 2005, and Pape, 2006) to 
empirical case studies have focused on foreign jihadis active outside America. 
Therefore, there are two steps in the broader platform of this study. The first step 
is to describe the psychosocial stance towards terrorism. This step is an important 
academic exercise in its own right because scholars employing the psychosocial 
methodology have often failed to draw the links between their own work and that of other 
scholars, drawing upon different versions of psychosocial theory. It is, therefore, 
significant in its own right that this study contains a literature review that unites the main 
psychosocial terrorism theories of the past 30 years, puts them into close conceptual 
engagement with each other, and explains how De la Corte‘s (2007) principles can be 
used to organize the theories. Additionally, as part of describing the psychosocial stance 
towards jihadism in particular, it will be necessary to demonstrate how existing 
approaches to jihadism—in particular, historical, theological, and political approaches—
can be subsumed within psychosocial theory. In order words, the psychosocial theory of 
jihadism is not a replacement to existing theories, but a new perspective that can be used 
to enhance the findings of other theories, such as those based in politics, religion, and 
history.  
The second step is to apply the psychosocial theory of jihadism to cases of 
homegrown jihadism. This step has two components. The first and more theoretical 
component demonstrates how psychosocial theories of jihadism can help to code and 
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explain prior acts of American jihadism. The second and more practical component is 
prediction and diagnosis; it looks to the future and explains how, based on how well the 
theory performed in assessing past studies, the psychosocial stance can be applied to 
detect, intervene in, and interdict American jihadism.   
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem has two intertwined components. The real-world aspect of the 
problem is that terrorism itself continues unabated, destroying lives and property all over 
the world. The academic aspect of the problem is that terrorism is far from being 
understood. It is only recently that significant academic attention has been devoted to the 
phenomenon of Islamist terrorism, which is the sole topic of this paper. 
Examining the phenomenon of jihadism is one of the most pressing intelligence, 
policy, and security issues of our time. Surprisingly, however, there is little substantive 
work in this field, largely due to the explosive politics that underlie the subject. Until the 
early 1970s, there was little or no English-language literature on the subject at all, 
probably because there had been no spectacular acts of terrorism committed by Muslims 
in Western heartlands until 1972 (Devji, 2005). In that year, the Black September Group 
killed a number of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics, ushering in an ongoing 
age of terrorism committed by Muslims. This first wave of terrorism was not necessarily 
Islamic terrorism per se because it was often committed by Palestinian secular 
nationalists who were not committed to either the principles of the practice of Islamic 
law. Wieviorka and White (2004) made the point that, in this era, Palestinian terrorists 
only took on the veneer of jihadists, or Muslim holy warriors, in order to convince certain 
Arab sponsors to fund them; privately, the Palestinians are committed to the secular cause 
of nationalism. 
A watershed moment occurred in 1979, the year in which the theocratic Iranian 
Revolution took place. The taking of American hostages on that occasion marked the first 
time since the Barbary Wars of the early nineteenth century that the American state 
approached a state of belligerence with a Muslim nation. However, even this event did 
not spur a widespread academic examination of the links between Islamism and 
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terrorism; it was treated by some scholars as a geopolitical event with Islamist 
undertones. Even Bernard Lewis (2001), ordinarily an astute observer of radical Muslim, 
wrote about the event as a social movement rather than an expression of physical 
violence against the Shah‘s secular regime and symbolic violence against the non-
Muslims of Iran (soon to be intimidated and expelled from the country).  
Interestingly, the U.S. policy community was ahead of the academic community 
in this regard. Bruce Hoffman‘s brief but masterful article on both Shia and Sunni 
terrorism demonstrates a profound awareness of the linkage between Islamism and 
terrorism. His work is particularly noteworthy for providing translations of clerical calls 
for terrorism, offering direct insight into theological rationalizations of violence 
(Hoffman, 1984). 
However, for much of the 1980s and 1990s, the academic discourse on Islam and 
terrorism was largely a branch of the discussion on Israel. Frankly, it was not until 
September 11, 2011, that, for obvious reasons, the subject went mainstream and cast a 
huge shadow across both academic and popular publishing. The problem during this 
period was the emergence and hardening of a polarized debate, with apologists for 
Islamism dissociating the religion from violence (recalling, in their way, the ―few bad 
apples‖ defense for Abu Ghraib) and Islamophobes launching hyperbolic and uniformed 
attacks on the entire religion. Esposito (2005) and Armstrong (2002) are examples of 
apologists (i.e., they treat Islam as a subject for uncritical celebration rather than critique, 
an approach much in vogue since Said (1979)). Not much more academically useful than 
apologists are those encyclopedists—like Lapidus (2002)—who skirted around the 
contemporary issues raised by Islam in favor of a purely archival approach. Fortunately, a 
few thoughtful scholars produced work that clarified the links between Islamism and 
terrorism without falling into this discursive trap. Fawaz Gerges produced a number of 
books of interviews with actual terrorists, offering genuine insight into how people who 
committed these atrocities linked them to religion (2005). 
Complementing Gerges‘ anthropological approach to the study of Islamist 
terrorism, Robert Pape (2006) became one of the very few clear-minded strategic analysts 
of the military logic of this phenomenon. Pape avoided the seemingly ubiquitous (in 
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academic and otherwise) urge to brand suicide terrorism irrational, and instead took it 
seriously on its own terms as a tactic with a long and successful history. A number of 
scholars (such as Howarth, 2005) also began to produce translations of Islamic texts, 
offering much-needed insight into the formal theory (as opposed to the informal theories 
turned up in Gerges‘ interviews) of Islamist terrorism.  
All of these scholarly works have touched on the problem of radicalization. In the 
United States and other Western countries, radicalization is a phenomenon responsible 
for converting ordinary members of society into terrorists or would-be terrorists. There is 
now a wide body of documentary data that discusses these home-grown terrorists and 
offers some context about their radicalization (Woodward, 2010) but, as of yet, existing 
theories of terrorism have not been rigorously applied to this population to determine and 
model what turns them to terrorism. The problem is that there is still no compelling 
theory of why people are radicalized into terrorist violence, even though there are a 
number of promising theoretical frameworks, such as those of Puar (2007) and De la 
Corte (2007) that could add further insight. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of the study is to apply qualitative research methodology to the 
following research questions: 
 Research Question 1: Can De la Corte‘s (2007) first, second, fifth, and 
sixth principles of psychosocial terrorism be applied to radicalization and, 
if so, how?   
 Research Question 2: If De la Corte‘s theory of the psychosocial basis of 
radicalization is affirmed, what is the threshold of difference between 
those who become radicalized and those who do not? 
 Research Question 3: Why does psychosocial radicalization lead to 
violence? 
The research questions build on each other and more, in pyramid fashion, from 
the broad to the targeted. The first research question asks whether the psychosocial theory 
of radicalization is, in fact, defensible. The second research question asks how 
psychosocial concepts can be tied into a threshold theory of violence—that is, how 
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psychosocial theories are capable of differentiating between those who act on 
radicalization and those who do not. The third research question asks how psychosocial 
theories can close the loop in terms of explaining actual violence. Even though the 
research questions will be assessed separately and by different means, they are still part 
of a unitary research agenda, which is to explain, defend, and detail an account of jihadi 
radicalization that draws upon both theory and empirical studies.    
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the study is qualitative, phenomenological, and rooted in the 
specific formats of case study and grounded theory coding. Data will come from primary 
and secondary sources pertaining to two major homegrown jihadis for whom extensive 
data is available and will be coded according to Hansen‘s (2008) grounded theory coding 
framework so as to show links between radicalization and De la Corte‘s (2007) 
psychosocial principles. The phenomenological theories drawn upon are Rosenberg‘s 
(1960) and Festinger‘s (1956) theories of attitude maintenance in the presence of 
uncertainty and psychic stress. 
D. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC 
LITERATURE 
While Chapter II is a thorough review of the literature, it is important to introduce 
some of the higher-level themes and concepts beforehand, to create the proper context for 
a more detailed discussion. Because the study is closely focused on Islamist 
radicalization, the literature is largely limited to treatments, theories, and histories of 
Muslim radicalization and the context in which it takes place. This study will not pay 
extensive attention to the history of terrorism, but will instead draw upon the literature to 
create a background sketch of the psychosocial circumstances in which radicalization 
takes place. Existing theories of jihadi terrorism will be discussed and subsumed into 
psychosocial theory. Table 1 captures some of the seminal work in the field (note that De 
la Corte‘s is not mentioned here, as it will be discussed extensively in both the second 
and the third chapters of the study).  
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Table 1.   Recent Work of Interest on Terrorism 





memoir. Bin Laden 
records his personal 
motivations for holy 
war and justifies 
terrorism in the name 
of Islam. 
Anecdotal. Bin Laden 
is here speaking for 
himself and, while 
immensely valuable, 
his perspective is not 
that of all Islamist 
terrorists. 






















causes of terrorism. 
The studies are largely 
commentaries on 
secondary sources; no 
direct context with 
jihadists themselves 
informs the research. 
A survey of many 
kinds of terrorism, 
including right-win 
terrorism, reminds 
us that Islamist 
terrorism might also 











Terrorism is an 
iterative activity that 
builds on previous 
methods and 
successes. 
Again, no direct data 
collected from 
jihadists. 
It is worth applying 
these findings to 
Islamist terrorism, 










Journey of the 
Jihadist. 
Qualitative: jihadists 
across the world are 
interviewed at length 
by Gerges, offering 
many life stories. 
Among the findings is 
the terrorists‘ 
realization that 
America, ‗the far 
enemy,‘ should surpass 
Israel as the ultimate 
target of action. 
Gerges presents a lot 
of data, but has not 
bothered to quantify 
any of it. Thus, a 
scholarly reader would 
have to do this work 
from scratch, e.g. in 
tabulating all the 
various justifications 









Item Findings Limitations Other Notes 
Pape, Dying to 
Win. 
Suicide terrorism is 
a strategic military 
tactic with a long 
history of success. 
Pape‘s analysis is at 
times too dry, draining 
the subject of its 
obvious emotional and 
religious 
underpinnings. He 
often makes jihadists 
seem like abstract 
agents in game theory. 
 
A possible 






The main cause of 
Islamist terror (of 
both the Sunni and 
Shia varieties) is the 
existential threat 
posed by Israel. 
 
The article, though 
informative, is short; 
longer excerpts from 
Muslim clerics would 
have been welcome. 
Background reading. 
Lewis, Islam in 
History. 
Terrorism is new to 
Islamic history, and 
should not be over-
emphasized in 
evaluating Islam as 
a civilization. 
As a historian, Lewis 
does not ask himself 
whether recent Islam 
has undergone a 
mutation in its DNA; 
its peacefulness 400 




From Osama Bin Laden to the Times Square Bomber, from Richard Reid to John 
Allen Muhammad and Nidal Hassan, America is under literal bombardment from 
terrorists and would-be terrorists (White, 2011). What was once a phenomenon 
geographically delimited to the Middle and Near East has struck throughout America. As 
radicalization spreads, it is entirely possible that there will be more and more analogues 
of the Times Square Bomber and John Allen Muhammad: born Americans, or legal 
residents of America with deep roots in the country, who decide to take to the way of 
jihad.  
The evidence demonstrates that radicals leave a trail behind them. No one wakes 
up transformed into a radical; there are predictable steps that lead from initial ideas about 
terrorism to socialization, recruitment, and eventually deployment into the field. In 
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studying these steps, it is theoretically possible to develop a profile of radicals that will be 
of great utility to populations ranging from sociologists to law enforcement personnel. 
Indeed, a procedure of this sort has been applied with great success to serial killers. Once 
mysterious objects of fear, serial killers have now been studied so thoroughly that they 
can be easily profiled. The early signs of being a potential serial killer are now so obvious 
that they can be acted upon and pre-empted by families, schools, law enforcement, and 
other authorities (Douglass, Burgess, & Burgess, 2011). 
A similar model will eventually be needed for radicals, particularly those who 
choose the path of jihad. At one level, such a model is now a practical necessity. As the 
number of homegrown Islamist radicals increases, it is a law enforcement necessity to 
better understand the process by which a jihadist is formed. The psychosocial approach 
modeled by De la Corte (2007) is highly promising in offering the beginnings of such a 
model. The psychosocial model is not only a plausible explanation of the birth of 
radicalization but also a template that can be used, at a practical level, to detect potential 
radicals. It is of special interest that, in the case of the Times Square Bomber, the 
terrorist‘s father was quoted as being in deep opposition to his son‘s philosophy, and 
claims he would have taken preventive action had he known what his son was planning 
(Barkun, 2011). There are many people—fathers, brothers, sisters, counselors, law 
enforcement officials, imams, social workers, and others—who could benefit from a 
better understanding of radicalization. 
Therefore, this study is of practical as well as academic significance. 
Academically, the study fills a gap in the psychosocial literature on terrorism by applying 
the De la Corte (2007) model to a hitherto little-studied aspect of the lifecycle of 
terrorism, namely radicalization. Practically, the study is of real-world value to any 
individual who needs to have a better understanding of radicalization, whether to 
diagnose, interdict, or manage it. The case study method, combined with the application 
of the psychosocial approach, is a way of coding the behavior of homegrown terrorists in 
a new and interesting way. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the literature review is threefold: (a) To understand what research 
reveals about the role of Islamism, history, culture, and religion itself in the radicalization 
of the jihadi personality; (b) to survey the evidence for a psychosocial theory of 
radicalization, not as an alternative to existing theories but as a new perspective on 
existing theories; and (c) to discuss Rosenberg‘s (1960) and Festinger‘s (1956) theories 
of personality as means to add conceptual content to the general psychosocial principles 
of De la Corte (2007), specifically, by explaining the key psychosocial differences 
between the radicalized and the radicalized.  The literature review is a wide survey of 
ideas, between which researchers can remain agnostic, but all of which can ultimately be 
put into a psychosocial context.  
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Examining the connection between radical Islam and terrorism is one of the most 
pressing intelligence, policy, and security issues of our time. Surprisingly, however, there 
is little substantive work in this field, largely due to the explosive politics that underlie 
the subject. Until the early 1970s, there was little or no English-language literature on the 
subject at all, probably because there had been no spectacular acts of terrorism committed 
by Muslims until 1972. In that year, the Black September Group killed a number of 
Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics, ushering in an ongoing age of terrorism 
committed by Muslims. This first wave of terrorism was not necessarily coded as Islamic 
terrorism per se, because it was often committed by Palestinian secular nationalists who 
were not committed to either the principles of the practice of Islamic law. Wieviorka and 
White (2004) made the point that, in this era, Palestinian terrorists only took on the 
veneer of jihadists, or Muslim holy warriors, in order to convince certain Arab sponsors 
to fund them; privately, the Palestinians were committed to the secular cause of 
nationalism. 
A watershed moment occurred in 1979, as that was the year in which the 
theocratic Iranian Revolution took place. The taking of American hostages on that 
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occasion marked the first time since the Barbary Wars of the early nineteenth century that 
the American state approached a state of belligerence with a Muslim nation. However, 
even this event did not spur a widespread academic examination of the links between 
radical Islam and terrorism; it was coded as a geopolitical event with Islamist undertones. 
Even Bernard Lewis (2004), ordinarily an astute observer of radical Muslim, wrote about 
the event as a social movement rather than as an expression of physical violence against 
the Shah‘s secular regime and symbolic violence against the non-Muslims of Iran (soon 
to be intimidated and expelled from the country). Interestingly, the U.S. policy 
community was ahead of the academic community in this regard. Hoffman‘s (1984) brief 
but masterful article on both Shia and Sunni terrorism demonstrates a profound 
awareness of the linkage between Islamism and terrorism. His work is particularly 
noteworthy for providing translations of clerical calls for terrorism, offering direct insight 
into theological rationalizations of violence. 
However, for much of the 1980s and 1990s, the academic discourse on Islam and 
terrorism was largely a branch of the discussion on Israel. Frankly, it was not until 
September 11, 2011, that, for obvious reasons, the subject went mainstream and cast a 
huge shadow across both academic and popular publishing. The problem during this 
period was the emergence and hardening of a polarized debate, with apologists for 
Islamism dissociating the religion from violence (recalling, in their way, the ―few bad 
apples‖ defense for Abu Ghraib) and Islamophobes launching hyperbolic and uniformed 
attacks on the entire religion. Fortunately, a few thoughtful scholars produced work that 
clarified the links between radical Islam and terrorism without falling into this discursive 
trap. Fawaz Gerges (2005, 2006) produced a number of books of interviews with actual 
terrorists, offering genuine insight into how people who committed these atrocities linked 
them to religion. 
Complementing Gerges‘ anthropological approach to the study of Islamist 
terrorism, Robert Pape (2006) became one of the very few clear-minded strategic analysts 
of the military logic of this phenomenon. Pape avoided the seemingly ubiquitous (in 
academic and otherwise) urge to brand suicide terrorism irrational, and instead took it 
seriously on its own terms as a tactic with a long and successful history. 
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A number of scholars (such as Lawrence & Howarth, 2006) also began to produce 
translations of Islamic texts, offering much-needed insight into the formal theory (as 
opposed to the informal theories turned up in Gerges‘ interviews) of Islamist terrorism. 
Combining original-source interviews and translations with a handful of strategic 
analyses offers the best chance of illustrating the link between radical Islam and terrorism 
is terms of not only theology but also politics and sociology. Finally, it is important to 
remember that terrorism is not a uniquely Islamist activity, and can be studied without 
making any specific appeal to the theological or political logic of Islam. To this end, a 
number of recent studies (including the work of Bjorgo, 2005; Smelser, 2007; & 
Neumann & Smith, 2007) offer high-level theories of terrorism that do not dwell 
specifically on Islam. 
B. HISTORY AND ISLAMISM AS PREDICTORS OF RADICALIZATION 
What prompts Islamist terrorism? Is it primarily historical grievance, as Lewis 
(2004) and Pape (2006) would suggest? Is it Islamism itself that justifies and leads to 
violence, as Hoffman (2009) suggests? Or is Jihadism the violence of the economically 
and politically dispossessed, as Wieviorka and White (2004) suggest? Is terrorism a kind 
of generic social and psychological phenomena (Bjorgo, 2005; Smelser 2007; Neumann 
& Smith, 2007) rooted in local grievances? Finally, is an extension of what might be 
called the band of brothers theory (i.e., terrorism as an affirmation of the martial values of 
a small group of like-minded men) advanced by Gerges (2005, 2006) and tacitly 
supported by Bin Laden (2005) himself? Taking scholars‘ depictions of events 
surrounding Iraq, 9/11, and Afghanistan as case studies, we can test these theories in the 
crucible of reality. 
The historical grievance theory of radicalization can be challenged. While Bin 
Laden (2005) was certainly aware of Islamic history, there is in indication that, for 
example, Taliban rank-and-file in Afghanistan or Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives share this 
awareness (and, hence, any grievance emerging from it). There are a number of 
independent data points that confirm this hypothesis. First, consider the statement made 
by Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban who fled Tora Bora in advance of the 
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U.S. assault. Omar bizarrely declared himself leader of the global Muslim community—
in a way that, as Devji (2005) noted, was deeply confused:  
…the Taliban leader Mullah Omar chose in Kandahar to drape himself in 
a mantle belonging to the Prophet and declare himself the Commander of 
the Faithful, a title used for the caliphs who were meant to be 
Muhammad‘s successors.  .In what way did this coronation conform to 
any Deobandi or Wahhabi teaching? If anything the vision of Mullah 
Omar donning the Prophet‘s mantle suggests Sufi and especially Shia 
themes, since the latter believe in the apostolic succession of those 
members of Muhammad‘s family whom he famously covered with his 
cloak. And it is precisely such forms of authority that both the Deobandis 
and Wahhabis are supposed to execrate. (Devji, 2005, pp. 22–23) 
It is impossible to understate the incoherence of Omar‘s gesture. In American 
terms, it is as if a quarterback for the Dallas Cowboys turned up in the Super Bowl 
wearing a Redskins uniform. The Taliban are not only the arch-enemies of Shi‘ism 
(Rashid, 2002, p. 74) but also part of a Sunni tradition in which only the ruler of the 
Arabian Peninsula—where the Qa‘aba, or shrine towards which all Muslims pray, is 
located—has any claim to bring recognized as caliph (Johnson, 1997, p. 154). Even such 
powerful Muslim dynasties as the Ottomans did not dare to call themselves caliphs until 
they had conquered Arabia (Karpat, 2001, p. 249) and taken control of the sacred 
mosque, or Masjid Al-Haram, wherein the Ka‘aba lies.  
However, even granted that the theology and historical knowledge of Islamist 
terrorists is shaky, that is not to prove that these strategies do not work with followers; 
history and theology serve as powerful motivators even if they are, frankly, wrongly 
interpreted. Consider the following passage from Bin Laden (2005): 
We believe the US is directly responsible for those who were killed in 
Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. The mention of the US reminds us before 
anything else of the innocent children who were dismembered, their heads 
and arms cut off...They [the Americans] should have been sensitive to the 
fact that the qibla of the Muslims raises the emotion of the entire Muslim 
world (pp. 46–47) 
Without discussing the truth value of Bin Laden‘s statement, it is still possible to 
recode the statement in terms of De la Corte‘s (2007) psychosocial principles (in 
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particular, principle five: ―The decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is 
always legitimized by an extreme ideology.‖ In fact, Bin Laden‘s statement also connects 
to De la Corte‘s first principle, that of influence: By deploying the trope of emotion, Bin 
Laden wished to draw funds and support from other Muslims. What matters is not the 
correctness of Bin Laden‘s historical analysis but rather the way in which, as an appeal to 
radicalization, his work turns the raw matter of history and religion into a psychosocial 
appeal to emotion, complete with the charnel imagery of decapitation and mutilation. 
There is clearly something psychosocial behind the currents of historical and theological 
discourse: Perhaps some form of masochistic reproach for the dismembered children, but 
certain an appeal to influence (principle one) and to ideology (principle five).     
Islamism seems to be a better candidate than history for explaining the kind of 
radicalization that leads to terrorism.  Certainly, there has been some speculation that Al 
Qaeda considers such actions a kind of permissible deception, an act of blending in that is 
religiously justified (Pape, 2006) as a part of stealth warfare (Hunter, 1876).  Here, too, 
the psychosocial principles of influence and ideology serve as complementary 
explanations to the theological explanation of Islamist behavior. Blending in, as the 9/11 
terrorists did, by drinking and going to strip clubs (Thompson, 2004, p. 204) is a way of 
winning influence over potentially suspicious members of the public, and it is also an 
assertion of the sheer power of ideology. If an ideology is powerful enough to forgive 
haram (forbidden) behavior, then surely the value of that (psychosocial) ideology is at 
least equal to any theological justification of violence. Meanwhile, what is psychosocial 
about this behavior is precisely its communal aspect: Ten jihadis performing an action of 
this sort together makes it communal, almost like prayer, and layers a psychosocial aspect 
over the tactical one. 
Another theory that tries to explain the link between radicalization and jihadism is 
the band of brothers theory. The theory was not given this name by Gerges (2006), who I 
think comes closest to proposing it, but I have chosen it as a description partly because it 
echoes Bin Laden‘s own imagery of jihadis being a group of knights. Band of Brothers 
was, most recently, a hit TV show about U.S. military personnel in the Second World 
War, but the band of brothers I have in mind is rather different and is based on a peer 
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group influence theory of behavior. The point of making this observation is not to suggest 
that it is new; however, what is novel is the realization that what appears to be tactical 
peer group behavior from the outside is psychosocial—even familial—from the inside. 
Consider the story of Ann Hansen, a Canadian terrorist who, along with four of 
her colleagues, bombed a Canadian missile factory in 1982. In her book, Hansen talks not 
only about her political consciousness but also about the ties that develop between her 
and the other members of what would become known as the Squamish Five. One of the 
most interesting things about these terrorists is that they are a family. Witness how 
Hansen (2001) describes the farewell between two members of the group: ―Julie and 
Gerry stepped a few feet away from us and kissed each other fondly‖ (p. 234). 
Hansen is a better writer than Osama Bin Laden, mainly because she is far more 
in touch with her feelings. I read Hansen‘s book with Bin Laden in mind much of the 
time—not because there is any political or social connection between the two but because 
I read Hansen as providing the secret autobiography of both Osama Bin Laden and the 
international jihadi movement. Jihadis are neither educationally nor temperamentally 
equipped for self-disclosure, and for this reason, their work tends to be stylized and 
impersonal. Hansen, for example, is able to make us really feel her frustration with 
Canadian politics, whereas Bin Laden‘s stilted writing style and refusal to tie his own life 
history in to his politics leaves anyone who is not already in sympathy with him cold.  
To go back to the point, though, Hansen‘s story is about how she and the 
Squamish Five come to be a family—a family that talks, thinks, eats, and even sleeps 
together. Hansen‘s real family was never close to her, and most of her friends and 
acquaintances let her down. She spent much of her early adulthood being exploited and 
misunderstood. Thus, when she finds like-minded people, it is as if she has found an 
oasis. One instantly understands her attraction to this group, and her willingness to do 
many things to belong to it, until one realizes that the end result is going to be an act of 
terrorism.  
Thus, radicalization can be said to be an intimate process overlaid with emotional 
and social significance—that is, a psychosocial process. Belonging to a family is 
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powerful; it is this instinct that accounts not only for biological families but also gangs, 
tribes, and nations (Ramakrishna, 2009). It is possible that radicalization of the Muslim 
into the jihadist is, in all its manifestations, the formation of a particular kind of 
dysfunctional family that shares the following characteristics. It is sometimes 
homosocial; that is, it is populated almost exclusively by men who, while not always or 
perhaps even frequently homosexual, are comfortable only with their own sex, and 
intimidated by, or angry at, women in real life and in the media. 
This argument is largely new when applied to terrorism, although it has been 
suggested by Puar (2007) in the context of Islamism. The idea is that some forms of 
jihadi violence are gendered, and that these forms of violence can also be understood as 
psychocosial phenomena, that is, phenomena that also take place in the ―in here‖ of 
thoughts, attitudes, and feelings and not just in the ―out there‖ of tactics, strategy, and 
cold historical and theological reasoning (Puar). Later, I will discuss case studies of 
jihadis for whom violence, while not explicitly gendered, can be treated as a psychosocial 
case of what Puar called homonationalism, although I admit that the motivations of these 
jihadis can also, and complementarily, be understood as historical, theological, and peer 
group phenomena. The purpose is not to argue for the superiority of any one 
interpretation but to overlay De la Corte‘s (2007) psychosocial principles on case studies 
of jihadi violence, which have seldom (if ever) been systematically coded from a 
psychosocial point of view and put into contact with classic psychosocial theories of 
violence and marginalization, such as those of Rosenberg (1960) and Festinger (1956). 
C. GENDERED VIOLENCE AND JIHADISM 
The purpose of this section of the literature review is to offer some evidence for 
gendered theories of jihadi violence. The suggestion is not that all jihadi violence can be 
understood qua gendered violence, or that gendered violence is unique to Islam, but to 
add another helpful concept to the existing Islamist and historical theories of jihadi 
violence. All of these theories are conceptual strands that will later be pulled together 
from the psychosocial perspective; it should not be inferred that their discussion in the  
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literature review is a reification of any one theory. They do, however, need to be placed 
on the table now, so that when they are drawn up in the coding in Chapter IV, the reader 
is aware of the theoretical support for their existence. 
To begin with, what is meant by the claim that a phenomenon is homosocial? 
Theorists have described the category of the homosocial as a form of behavior, thinking, 
and cultural experience (that is, a psychosocial gestalt) that creates a sphere from which 
women are absent (Weed & Schor, 1997). Homosocial behavior has deep roots across 
much of the Middle and Near East, the heartlands of Islam. In the Prophet Muhammad‘s 
lifetime, and by the sanction of verses revealed in the Qur‘an, the intermingling of men 
and women was increasingly forbidden (Ali & Leaman, 2008). In practice, women were 
not enjoined to take part in the communal Friday prayer and, when they entered mosques, 
were relegated to the back, put behind curtains, or even directed to basements. This 
tradition continues unabated in mosques today (Joseph & Najmabadi, 2005). To note this 
fact is by no means to suggest that gender segregation is unique to Islam.  
Indeed, Islam‘s homosocial nature takes its roots from the patriarchal form of life 
of the ancient Semites, of whom Arab Muslims are a branch. In Semitic life, such that led 
by the Hebrews in ancient times, the woman was considered ritually impure because of 
her menstruation (Maccoby, 1999). Thus, Jewish women were not encouraged to be 
around the Temple and played a diminished role in Jewish life as mothers, wives, 
daughters, and sisters only (Fonrobert, 2002). Islam‘s Judaic roots are widely 
acknowledged by scholars (Lewis, 2002); indeed, the first qibla of Islam was Jerusalem 
and the Qur‘an, like the Torah, prescribes three prayers a day for Muslims (two more 
prayers were added in Muslim practice, but the Qur‘an only mentions three). (Lewis, 
2002).  
Thus, the role of women in early Islam was partly due to the theological influence 
of Judaism. The Qur‘an, again like the Torah, depicted women as being impure during 
their menstruation and commanded them to refrain from prayer at such times; 
additionally, any man who touched a menstruating woman was deemed to be ritually 
defiled, requiring a complex form of ablution to be once more ready to pray (Joseph & 
Najmabadi, 2005). However, in addition to these theological demotions of woman to the 
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status of an unclean and distracting object, there was also a strong cultural influence cast 
over Islam by nomadic Bedouin customs in which the role of the woman was to birth 
children and prepare food, while only men enjoyed mobility. All of these factors have led 
many scholars to define Islam and Muslim culture as deeply homosocial (Meri & 
Bacharach, 2006). 
There are, however, two points to be made about the kind of homosocial behavior 
that has prevailed in the Muslim world after the seventh century. One point is that the 
homosocial has frequently been accompanied by the straightforwardly homosexual. 
Homosexual behavior was extremely widespread in the classical Muslim world (Habib, 
2010). The second point is that, while enjoining the homosocial, the Qur‘an is 
unequivocal about the sinfulness of actually homosexual behavior. Because the line 
between these two forms of behavior is so thin, there has subsequently been a great deal 
of anxiety and guilt among Muslim men in terms of their relationships with other men 
(El-Rouayheb, 2005). Some prominent Muslim clerics even issued religious rulings, or 
fatwas, that homosexual behavior was permissible on the grounds that a boy who had not 
yet grown a beard could count as a woman in religious law (Neill, 2009). Muslim history 
is packed with whimsical attempts to align homosexuality with sound Islam practice 
(Lewis, 2004), creating a great deal of cognitive dissonance and confusion in the process.  
The first time that terrorism and homosexuality mixed overly in Islamic history 
was under Hassan as-Sabah, the so-called Old Man of the Mountain, who formed the sect 
of the Assassins in the eleventh century. Sabah took young men to his mountaintop 
castle, addicted them to opium and homosexual sex, and then withdrew these pleasures 
from them until they went out and served as assassins for him (Dughlt, 2008). For much 
of the rest of the Middle Ages, themes of homosexuality and military violence mixed 
closely in Islam. The Ottoman Turks created an elite all-male fighting corps known as the 
janissaries and forbade them to live married lives, which of course in an era of all-male 
barracks was an open invitation to homosexuality. As Edgerton (2000) colorfully 
described the situation, ―By the mid-1600s, over 50,000 Janissaries lived as homosexuals 
under absolute military discipline‖ (p. 35). The reasoning behind this strategy was likely 
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that a cadre of men homosexually dedicated to each other and with no families would be 
more loyal than men with families and attachments to lovers outside the barracks.  
These historical precedents are important because they demonstrate that ideas of 
violence, homosexuality / homosociality, and extreme violence have routinely coexisted 
in Muslim contexts for nearly a thousand years. In fact, the connection between 
homosexuality and the basic function of the state has warranted the name of 
homonationalism from Puar (2007). Here are states for by men, of men, and cemented by 
male desire for each other. It is, therefore, not so far-fetched that psychosocial echoes of 
these practices would have mutated and survived into the present day jihadi context.  
Jihadi radicalization begins as a male pull of other men away from women and from the 
influence of women. It is an exclusively male world, a fact that receives insufficient 
attention in scholarly and security analyses. While no jihadi has so far outed himself—
which makes sense, as the punishment in Islam law for homosexuality is death (Lewis, 
2002)—this psychosocial dynamic of homosociality deserves further consideration as an 
explanatory factor for radicalization. 
D. TOWARDS A PSYCHOSOCIAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
RADICALIZATION 
The discussion in the previous section of the literature review allows several 
principles to be tied together into a single perspective into Islamist radicalization: A 
psychosocial window. Consider Table 2. 
Table 2.   De la Corte‘s Psychosocial Principles of Terrorism 
Principle Description 
1 First psychosocial principle: Terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome 
but as a method of social and political influence. 
2 Second principle: The attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of 
social interaction.  
3 Third principle: Terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with 
other social movements. 
4 Fourth principle: Terrorism only is possible when terrorists have access 




Fifth principle: The decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is 
always legitimized by an extreme ideology. 
6 Sixth principle: Every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the 
rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect. 
7 Seventh principle: The activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal 
features of their organizations 
The second principle should actually come first in the causal chain. The first step 
of radicalization is the process of, as I shall argue, interaction, regardless of whether such 
interaction is gregarious, homosocial, rational, etc. The second step is the formation of a 
shared bond into something greater, an actual movement (principle three) that creates a 
spurious ideology (step four) to legitimize itself. The third step is the deployment of this 
movement into influence (principle one) through violence (principle six). The third 
chapter, on methodology, I will then demonstrate how the theory can be applied to case 
studies, which comprise Chapter IV, in ways that allow for the mapping of each of De la 
Corte‘s principles on to a set of jihadi motivations. In this way, a new psychosocial 
perspective on jihadi violence emerges, one that calls attention to the psychosocial 
dimensions of what have previously been taken to be historical, theological, or political 
phenomena.  
In grounded theory approaches to qualitative study, theory emerges from data 
(Hansen, 2008). It is therefore premature to offer an explicit theoretical framework for 
the psychosocial perspective on jihadi radicalization. However, the point to be made is 
that a richer understanding of jihadi radicalization as possible as long as external 
components of grievance, tactics, history, enfranchisement, and theology are interwoven 
with the internal components of individual and group psychology, and how it has played 
out in special jihadi contexts—for example, the context of homonationalism in some 
instances, and the context of ideological resistance to the U.S. in others. In doing so, I 
will develop a new medium of discursive analysis of jihadism, not a new interpretation of 
jihadism itself.  
There is, however, a gap between the De la Corte‘s (2007) principles, useful as 
they are, and the application of psychosocial theory to cases of homegrown jihadism. The 
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main drawback is that De la Corte‘s theory is underdetermined; it does not explain, for 
example, how the very same process of social interaction could turn one young American 
Muslim into a jihadi but leave another unaffected. Therefore, a richer and more 
explanatory theoretical framework needs to be attached to De la Corte‘s seven principles, 
a framework that can explain and account for the dividing lines between the jihadi and 
the jihadi. Such a framework can be adduced from the works of Rosenberg (1960) and 
Festinger (1956). 
E. UNDERLYING THEORIES OF PSYCHOSOCIAL CONTEXTS AND 
VIOLENCE 
Here is Rosenberg‘s (1960) theory of identity and behavior formation: 
When the affective and cognitive components of an attitude are mutually 
consistent, the attitude is in a stable state; when the affective and cognitive 
components are mutually inconsistent…the attitude is in an unstable state 
and will undergo spontaneous reorganizing activity until such activity 
eventuates either in (a) attainment of affective-cognitive consistency or (b) 
the placing of an ―irreconcilable‖ inconsistency beyond the range of active 
awareness. (p. 20)  
This general theory of psychic consistency coexists nearly with other 
psychosocial theories: Festinger‘s (1956) theory of cognitive dissonance and also with 
the theory of stigma, which has been espoused by several theorists. Festimger‘s work 
concluded that when people either know or fear that they are wrong, they will at first go 
to great lengths to avoid facing with this fact. Stigma theory suggests that one way of 
avoiding the pain of knowing that one is wrong is to split off into two selves. This act of 
splitting reduces the stigma that one feels, lowers cognitive dissonance, and also 
achieves—temporarily—Rosenberg‘s state of attitude alignment: When the affective and 
cognitive components of an attitude are mutually consistent, the attitude is in a stable 
state; when the affective and cognitive.  
Following this model, the ―spontaneous reorganizing activity‖ mentioned by 
Rosenberg (1960) is actually a flowchart of possibilities, beginning with pure attitude 
(either affective or cognitive) and ending in pure behavior (e.g., jihadism). In other  
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words, terrorism can be conceived at the personal level of a person trying to manage 
dissonance, stigma, and inconsistency between affect and cognition. The original graphic 
in Figure 1 lends some visual clarity to the theory: 
 
Figure 1.   A Psychosocial Model Based on Rosenberg‘s (1960) Construct of 
Inconsistency 
Building on Rosenberg‘s model, it is assumed that all behaviors (including 
terroristic ones) begin as two kinds of attitudes, affective (emotional) and cognitive 
(rational). Rosenberg‘s theory of personality is that, when two dimensions of attitudes on 
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a particular topic are in sync with each other, a person will take no special ―reorganizing‖ 
action to balance them. For example, a man who both knows that Islam enjoins peace and 
feels that Islam enjoins peace will be consistent on this topic and will not suffer cognitive 
load or psychic stress as a consequence. On the other hand, someone who cognitively 
understands that the Qur‘an forbids terrorism but who affectively feels that terrorism is 
called for as a legitimate political and military response to perceived imperialism is in a 
state of attitude instability that, according to Rosenberg, can only end when one of the 
conflicting attitudes is either abandoned or reinforced beyond the point of ambiguity.   
Cognitive dissonance refers to the subjective psychological state of a person who 
believes A to be true while presented with convincing evidence that not-A is true. 
Festinger (1956) noted that people experiencing cognitive dissonance had one of two 
choices: They could either conclusively accept one of the conflicting beliefs (resulting in 
consonance), or they could continue to live in a state of dissonance, which would exact a 
psychic toll. Festinger‘s greatest empirical result was his discovery that, when confronted 
with data that had been disproven, many so-called true believers would actually redouble 
the intensity of their belief in the deposed paradigm. This result explained the 
phenomenon of believers in failed prophecies, who retained their beliefs in the face of all 
disconfirmation.  
As Cook, Noyes, and Masakowski (2007) have it, ―the psychological state created 
by uncertainty is very painful‖ (p. 45). According to both Festinger (1956) and 
Rosenberg (1960), human beings will tend to manage this pain through psychosocial 
means. On a personal psychological level, as Nordgren, van Harreveld, and van der Pligt 
(2004) argued, ―people spontaneously engage in biased information processing in order 
to resolve their ambivalence‖ (p. 252). On a social level, people will associate with others 
who hold the same beliefs as a means of shutting out the possible pain of actually being 
wrong about their belief (Festinger). Thus, people who face uncertainty tend to engage in 
personal forms of biased information processing and band together with others who do 
not threaten their beliefs. This statement is not controversial; it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated, first by Festinger‘s (1958) experimental confirmation of his 1956 results 
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and by subsequent social psychologists. The real question is whether the theory has 
applicability to the eruption of jihadi violence (as a subset of other kinds of violence). 
It is here that Rosenberg (1960) is more helpful than Festinger (1956). Festinger‘s 
work did not extend to actual physical violence, partly because Festinger found violence 
to be a rare kind of solution to problems of ambiguity, self-doubt, and general personality 
turbulence. However, Rosenberg was more convinced than Festinger that violence was a 
common solution to problems of ambiguity, specifically cognitive-affective ambiguity. 
By engaging in a violence action, Rosenberg reasoned, it was possible for a formerly 
conflicted person to affirm one aspect of their psyche over the other. Thus, according to 
Rosenberg, violence can also be understood as a means of psychic release that frees the 
doer of violence from ambiguity, doubt, and indecision. 
The red arrows in Figure 1 represent this kind of violence, which comes as an 
alternative to attitude abandonment (indicated by green arrows). At some point, 
Rosenberg (1960) argued, most people living in psychic ambiguity will find a way to 
align their personality by getting rid of, or somehow modifying, one of the clashing 
beliefs. However, some minority of people will not be able to do so successfully. These 
people have two options. They can keep living with the psychic pain that comes with 
ambiguity and contradiction (see Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2004), or 
they can try to use violence to transcend ambiguity and contradiction. 
It is here that the true usefulness of the psychosocial stance should become 
apparent. For the psychosocial stance is a meta-interpretation; it can account for all kinds 
of ambiguities, doubts, and beliefs. The psychosocial theory of Rosenberg (1960), for 
example, can account for many different kinds of jihadi radicalization, as Chapter IV will 
demonstrate in more depth. For example, because Rosenberg‘s theory is agnostic about 
the content of ambiguity, it can account for historical, political, personal, ideological, and 
theological grievances without any loss in explanatory power. All that the theory 
requires, and assumes, is the presence of: (a) psychosocial conflict, (b) attempts at 
psychosocial resolution, and (c) failure at both resolution and the ability to keep living 
with a lack of resolution. Once these three aspects of a case study are demonstrated, 
Rosenberg (1960), with theoretical backup from Festinger (1956), adds the explanatory 
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capacity that was missing in De la Corte‘s (2007) theory and makes it possible to 
understand and break down the radicalization process step by step. The application of this 
method will become clear in Chapter III. 
1. The Importance of Degradation 
Davies (1965) argued that ―degradation produces revolution‖ (p. 95). Davies, a 
scholar whose subject of study is revolution, took as his research question the issue of 
why a revolution took place at a specific point in time rather than sooner or later. His 
answer sheds a lot of light not only on revolution but also on jihadism. The first part of 
the answer has to do with what creates a revolutionary mood: ―The crucial factor is the 
vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost‖ 
(p. 98). The next part of the answer takes up the issue of what turns a mood into a set of 
concrete actions, like the storming of a building or the planting of a bomb, which are in 
the post-radicalization stages of De la Corte‘s (2007) principles Davies lists a number of 
factors, all of which have to be in place: there has to be instrumentality (i.e., an ability to 
act) (for example, there have to be enough volunteers for suicide bombing, and enough 
IED components to wage a bombing campaign); there has to be a belief that the act of 
terrorism can succeed and, indeed, there have to be ―rising expectations‖ for the success 
of the movement (pp. 98–99). Last, but not least, the opposing force—typically the 
state—cannot be too strong, or it will simply wipe the movement out (p. 99). 
The concept of degradation looms so large in the coding of jihadi narratives that it 
does not even need special analysis. Both Faisal Shahzad and Adam Gadahn, the jihadis 
chosen for further analysis in chapter four, are convinced that Islam is less than it was; 
previous Muslims were more pious, and previous Muslim states were more powerful. 
Shahzad in particularly was deeply traumatized by the knowledge of Islam‘s lost power. 
At any rate, even though degradation is not specifically invoked in the coding, it ought to 
be kept in mind as a factor in explaining why jihadis become radicalized. 
 27 
F. CONCLUSION 
The psychosocial interpretation of terrorism, as De la Corte (2007) presented it, is 
precisely that: an interpretation. It can coexist with, and indeed lend value to, other 
interpretations; in this way, the psychosocial interpretation can be described as a meta-
interpretation or meta-analysis of jihadism. This literature review has demonstrated that 
the main themes of jihadi violence can be placed into a wrapper of psychosocial 
interpretation and has indeed listed what these themes are. It has not been claimed that 
any theme (such as homosocial behavior versus historical grievance) is explanatorily 
superior to another; yet, the main forms of support for each theory have been presented, 
and will later be woven into a psychosocial perspective that is capable of accommodating 
and adding value to all of these theories without trying to reify any one of them.   
The next chapter, that of the methodology, will examine how case studies can be 
constructed to illuminate the various aspects of psychosocial interpretation of jihadism 
and Chapter IV will consist of the case studies, as well as their coding. Many of the 
themes first encountered in the literature review will recur in the methodology.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the discussion of the methodology is to explain and defend the 
means by which the analytical case studies laid out in chapter four will be conducted. 
There are two components of the discussion of methodology: (a) a general explanation of 
the case study method and how its validity and reliability can be defended and (b) a 
specific analysis of the psychosocial means of analysis that will be deployed in the case 
studies. 
A. THE CASE STUDY METHOD: A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
One way to understand how case studies function is research is to start from the 
very top: 
Table 3.   Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research   (Creswell 
2009, p. 56) 




Ontology (perceptions of 
reality) 
Researchers assume that 
multiple, subjectively 
derived realities can 
coexist. 
Researchers assume that a 
single, objective world 
exists. 
Epistemology (roles for the 
researcher) 
Researchers commonly 
assume that they must 
interact with their studied 
phenomena. 
Researchers assume that 
they are independent from 
the variables under study. 
Axiology (researchers‘ 
values) 
Researchers overtly act in a 
value-laden and biased 
fashion. 
Researchers overtly act in a 
value-free and unbiased 
manner. 
Rhetoric (language styles) Researchers often use 
personalized, informal, and 
context-laden language. 
Researchers most often use 
impersonal, formal, and 
rule-based text. 
Procedures (as employed in 
research) 
Researchers tend to apply 




Researchers tend to apply 
deduction, limited cause-
and-effect relationships, 
with context-free methods. 
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As a method of research, the case study format is qualitative. It assumes that there 
are multiple, subjective worlds; relies on a model of researcher interaction with and 
subjective interpretation of the available data; does not rule out value and bias in the 
formation of interpretation; is expressed in context-laden and often informal language; 
and is inferential and narrative rather than deductive and quantifiable. As a format, the 
case study chooses only a few subjects for study. In doing so, the researcher sacrifices 
breadth of understanding for depth of understanding. Dilating on a handful of cases offers 
the ability to go deeper into the research phenomena and to more meaningfully illuminate 
the research phenomenon. While case studies are not held to be generalizable in the same 
way as quantitative research, they offer interpretive and explanatory advantages; they can 
illuminate a phenomenon from the inside in a way that quantitative research cannot.  
Case studies involving humans operate on two levels. First, such studies are 
phenomenological, meaning that they attempt to see reality from within the subject‘s 
point of view. However, case studies are also analytical, meaning that they do not 
uncritically accept a subject‘s point of view, but subject it to closer examination and 
critique. This approach distinguishes the case study from a narrative of lives qualitative 
methodology, in which the subject‘s own narrative is considered sacrosanct.  
The bias inherent in case studies can be reduced but not eliminated. Research 
ethics demand the disclosure of potential biases in the case study method and 
explanations of how bias was reduced in the study.  Furthermore, the interpretive system 
involved in a case study—in this case, the explanatory framework that is rooted in the 
paradigm of psychosocial radicalization and the specific prisms of homosociality, 
ideology, and influence—should be closely and carefully explained, so that the reader can 
evaluate the soundness of the interpretive system and come to other conclusions, if 
warranted. In other words, the case study format calls on researchers to discuss and 
defend alternative explanations as well. The ethics of the case study method depend on 
whether data is being collected from living subjects and whether, if data is collected from 
dead subjects, the researcher has not distorted or cherry-picked the data (a point that also 
goes to case study validity and reliability).  All of the ways in which the current case  
 
 31 
study satisfies the best practices of the case study methodology will be examined in 
Chapter IV. The purpose of this section has been to disclose the main characteristics of 
the case study format. 
B. THE ROLE OF CODING 
Table 4 is an application of grounded theory coding to a statement made by Bin 
Laden. 
Table 4.   Example of Grounded Theory Coding 
Original Data Coding 
We believe the U.S. is directly responsible 
for those who were killed in Palestine, 
Lebanon, and Iraq. The mention of the U.S. 
reminds us before anything else of the 
innocent children who were dismembered, 
their heard and arms cut off...They [the 
Americans] should have been sensitive to 
the fact that the qibla of the Muslims raises 
the emotion of the entire Muslim world. 
Extra-local influences on psychosocial 
development. 
 
Radicalization as revenge for real or 
imagined slights. 
 
Reciprocal radicalization: If you are 
radical, we will also be radical. 
According to Hansen (2008), grounded theory is ―the systematic generation of 
theory from data that has been empirically collected and analyzed‖ (p. 3). Hesse-Biber 
and Leavy (2008) explained, ―Researchers conduct initial grounded theory coding by 
comparing incidents or by coding word by word, line by line, or paragraph by 
paragraph…The line-by-line grounded theory coding goes deeper into the phenomenon 
and attempts to explicate it‖ (p. 164). 
Thus, Table 3 demonstrates the main method of qualitative analysis to be 
employed in this study. By coding data about radicalization—both in primary and 
secondary sources—a larger set of psychosocial explanations will emerge. The goal of 
coding is to determine how, or whether, De la Corte‘s main psychosocial themes of 
terrorism emerge from the data: 
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Table 5.   [reprinted] De la Corte‘s Psychosocial Principles of Terrorism 
Principle Description 
1 First psychosocial principle: Terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome 
but as a method of social and political influence. 
2 Second principle: The attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of 
social interaction.  
3 Third principle: Terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with 
other social movements. 
4 Fourth principle: Terrorism only is possible when terrorists have access 
to certain resources. 
5 Fifth principle: The decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is 
always legitimized by an extreme ideology. 
6 Sixth principle: Every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the 
rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect. 
7 Seventh principle: The activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal 
features of their organizations 
Of particular interest in this study are Principles 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Principle 4 is not 
being considered because it is possible to become radicalized and committed to terrorism 
without having thought to what resources are available to actually execute terrorism 
(Pape, 2006). Principle 7 is also omitted, because it encompasses the activity of terrorists 
whereas radicalization can fail to result in actual terrorist activity (for example, when a 
planned attack fails). Given the strategy of grounded theory that is being used to organize 
and explore the data, these are the main themes that will be sought in the transcripts of 
radicalization narratives. 
Table 6.   Main Themes of the Psychosocial Theory of Terrorism 
Principle Themes 
1 Desire to exert (a) social and (b) political influence—e.g., over friends, 
community, family, country, city, world. Look for psychological 
characteristics such as anxiety, megalomania, need for control, inability to 
tolerate ambiguity, etc. 
2 Radicalization emerging from social interaction—e.g., contacts in mosques, 
radical friends, visiting radical Web sites, living in countries with large 
populations of proselytizing radicals. Look for links between social 






Radicalization as a social movement—e.g., it will have a platform, peer 
pressure, an orthodoxy, self-reinforcement, penalties for leaving, and other 
aspects of social movements. Again, look for links between social 
interaction and formation of the individual radical‘s psyche. 
 
4 Radicalization as ideology. Look for aspects of the radical‘s psyche and 
social circle that promote orthodoxy, reject heterodoxy, and surrender 
decision-making power to ideas. 
5 Radicalization as rationality gone wrong. Look for psychological 
pathologies: Irrationality, magical thinking, circular reasoning, logical 
fallacies, etc.  
Table 5 is, in essence, the bridge between De la Corte‘s (2007) theory, the coding 
strategy, and the data. It demonstrates what kind of themes need to be found in the 
grounded theory coding to justify the application of De la Corte‘s principles to cases of 
homegrown jihadi radicalization.  
It only remains to explain how Rosenberg‘s (1960) theory of psychosocial 
conflict is to be mapped on to De la Corte‘s (2007) principles. Table 6 is a demonstration 
of exactly how this goal has been accomplished. 
Table 7.   Applying Rosenberg (1960) to De la Corte (2007) 
Psychosocial Principle Search for Themes Resolution v. Turbulence 
First psychosocial 
principle: Terrorism 
must not be seen as a 
syndrome but as a 
method of social and 
political influence. 
 
Desire to exert (a) social 
and (b) political influence 
(e.g., over friends, 
community, family, 
country, city, world). Look 
for psychological 
characteristics such as 
anxiety, megalomania, need 
for control, inability to 
tolerate ambiguity, etc. 
Does psychic conflict exist? 
How is that conflict managed 
(e.g., biased information 
processing, groupthink)? 
What is the resolution of the 
conflict? 
Second principle: The 
attributes of terrorists 
are shaped by processes 
of social interaction.  
 
Radicalization emerging 
from social interaction 
(e.g., contacts in mosques, 
radical friends, visiting 
radical Web sites, living in 
Does psychic conflict exist? 
How is that conflict managed 
(e.g., biased information 
processing, groupthink)? 
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Psychosocial Principle Search for Themes Resolution v. Turbulence 
countries with large 
populations of proselytizing 
radicals). Look for links 
between social interaction 
and formation of the 
individual radical‘s psyche. 
 




can be analyzed by 
analogy with other 
social movements. 
 
Radicalization as a social 
movement (e.g., it will have 
a platform, peer pressure, 
an orthodoxy, self-
reinforcement, penalties for 
leaving, and other aspects 
of social movements). 
Again, look for links 
between social interaction 
and formation of the 
individual radical‘s psyche. 
Does psychic conflict exist? 
How is that conflict managed 
(e.g., biased information 
processing, groupthink)? 
What is the resolution of the 
conflict? 
Fifth principle: The 
decision to begin and 
sustain a terrorist 
campaign is always 
legitimized by an 
extreme ideology. 
 
Radicalization as ideology. 
Look for aspects of the 
radical‘s psyche and social 
circle that promote 
orthodoxy, reject 
heterodoxy, and surrender 
decision-making power to 
ideas. 
Does psychic conflict exist? 
How is that conflict managed 
(e.g., biased information 
processing, groupthink)? 
What is the resolution of the 
conflict? 
Sixth principle: Every 
terrorist campaign 
involves strategic goals 
but the rationality 
which terrorists apply to 
their violence is 
imperfect. 
 
Radicalization as rationality 




reasoning, logical fallacies, 
etc.  
 
Does psychic conflict exist? 
How is that conflict managed 
(e.g., biased information 
processing, groupthink)? 
What is the resolution of the 
conflict? 
Table 6 is the key instrument that will enable Chapter IV‘s coding of homegrown 
jihadism as demonstrated in the case studies of Faisal Shahzad, Adam Gadahn, and other 
homegrown terrorists. Table 6 contains the specific psychosocial principles, their themes, 
and their theoretical underpinning (resolution versus turbulence) that explain the 
mounting tempo of radicalization for the true behavior and also why radicalization fails 
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for others.  Table 6 helps to place the coding into a structure that is at once transparent 
and justified by both the literature and methodology of this study, such that the findings 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
There are only two case studies in this chapter: Faisal Shahzad and Adam 
Gadahn. These cases were chosen for specific reasons that ought to be explained in some 
depth. First, both Shahzad and Gadahn were formally and informally associated with 
jihadi movements for quite some time. Second, Shahzad and Gadahn represent forking 
paths on Rosenberg‘s (1960) theory of personality integration. Shahzad, also known as 
the Times Square Bomber, plotted to kill as many American civilians as possible in a 
bomb attack, but Gadahn has, so far, only been a radio propagandist. Another difference 
is that, although both are homegrown jihadis, Shahzad is of Pakistani extraction whereas 
Gadahn was born to American parents of Jewish background. Still, both men fell prey to 
the allure of radicalization. Choosing only two case studies of homegrown jihadism 
makes it possible to drill down to a level of detail that is not possible to achieve with a 
larger mass of studies. Also, the choice of two contrasting cases demonstrates how the 
insertion of Rosenberg‘s theoretical apparatus differentiates between radicalization that 
leads to violence and radicalization that is resolved short of violence. 
A. FAISAL SHAHZAD 
Building on De la Corte (2007), there are five psychological principles to be 
sought in the case of Faisal Shahzad: social and political influence, social interaction, 
analogy with other social movements, extreme ideology, and imperfect rationality applied 
to violence.  The coding of statements from, and about, Shahzad, will detect each of these 
themes and then explain how, in Rosenberg‘s (1960) conceptual vocabulary, the 
psychosocial conflicts underlying these themes came about, were applied to a process of 
resolution, and ultimately led to a violent break. The data from the coding will come from 
a combination of Faisal Shahzad‘s court testimony and from journalistic and personal 
accounts of his radicalization.  
Faisal Shahzad was born in Pakistan to a high-ranking former officer in the 
Pakistani Air Force. Shahzad‘s father was, by all accounts, a secular person, and so was 
Shahzad. Shahzad, while nominally a Muslim, did not appear to be a fundamentalist 
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during his time in Pakistan. When he went to study in the United States in 1999, he 
apparently visited nightclubs and engaged in secular pursuits. 
When Mr. Shahzad started classes there [in the U.S.], more than a third of 
the college‘s students were foreigners—15 of them from Pakistan. Mr. 
Shahzad stood out. He walked with a confident air, showing off his gym-
honed muscles in tight T-shirts. He carried the air of a privileged 
upbringing, coming off as aloof and, at times, snobbish. While the 
Pakistani students stuck together, playing cricket and collecting free meals 
at the campus mosque, Mr. Shahzad had a wider circle of friends and a 
fuller social calendar. A skilled cook, he drew students to his dorm room 
with the scent of his simmering lobia, a Pakistani lentil dish. He worked 
out obsessively and, on weekends, hit New York City‘s Bengali-theme 
nightclubs. He loved women, recalled a former classmate, and ―could 
drink anyone under the table.‖ He showed little interest in Islam. (Elliott, 
Tavernise, & Barnard, 2010) 
Shahzad was a classic study in homegrown radicalization. A naturalized U.S. 
citizen, Shahzad was schooled and employed in the United States and later came to be 
married to a U.S.-born woman of Pakistani extraction. As the extract from Elliott et al. 
disclosed, Shahzad appeared to be living a comfortable and indeed hedonistic life, with 
no hint of either Islamism or jihadism in him. However, less than five years from the 
period of Shahzad‘s life portrayed by Elliott et al., he attempted to bomb Times Square.  
Table 8.   The Court Statement of Faisal Shahzad and Coding 
Narrative Coding 
I hope that the judge and the Court will listen to 
me before they sentence me. In the name of Allah, 
the most gracious, the most merciful, this is but 
one life. If I am given a thousand lives, I will 
sacrifice them all for the sake of Allah fighting this 
cause, defending our lands, making the word of 
Allah supreme over any religion or system. We 
Muslims don't abide by human-made laws, 
because they are always corrupt. And I had a 
firsthand experience when on the second day of 
my arrest I asked for the Miranda. And the FBI 
denied it to me for two weeks, effecting harm to 
my kids and family, and I was forced to sign those 
Mirandas. .. and so it's very clear for us Muslims, 
either we are with the mujahideen or we are with 
 
Desire for sociopolitical influence: 
Wants to be heard. 
 
Influence: Aware of audience. 
Ideology of jihad. 
Imperfect rationality: Defends 
„there‟ by attacking innocents 
„here.‟ 
 
Third person: Speaking for larger 






crusading losing Christians. There is no in 
between. Blessed the immigrants and the leader 
Sheikh Usama Bin Laden, who will be known as 
no less than Saladin of the 21st century crusade 
and blessed be those who give him asylum. 
References social interaction with 
other jihadis. 
No in between: Shahzad is now 
freed of ambiguity. 
 
What happened between Shahzad‘s entry into the United States and his 
transformation into a radical? A good place to look for interpretations is through 
Shahzad‘s own narrative, as spoken at his sentencing in a U.S. federal court. The 
comments on the right side of the table are forms of grounding theory coding, which call 
attention to the main themes in the data and prepare the way for more explanation and 
analysis. In the case of Shahzad‘s court statement, all five of De la Corte‘s (2007) 
psychosocial themes of radicalization are present, in addition to a statement that recalls 
Rosenberg‘s (1960) theory of personality. Before putting all of this data into a format that 
shows the trajectory of Shahzad‘s psychosocial process, however, Shahzad‘s story should 
be completed.   
The full trajectory of what happened to Shahzad between 1999, the year of his 
first arrival in the United States, and 2010, the year of his arrest, is not well known. There 
is only a cloud of details. Shahzad, the youngest child of a very wealthy family, was an 
average student and an average person with a squarely middle-class job. In his 
photographs before the arrest, Shahzad dresses well and at one point bought a Mercedes. 
Shahzad was in an arranged marriage in 2004. In the existing photographs of Shahzad 
with his wife, he is holding himself at an angle away from her while she is the one 
leaning more closely into him. At some point by 2006, Shahzad had ceased to be on good 
terms with his wife. He demanded, first, that she cover herself and remain at home 
instead of working. Later, when she refused, he gave her an ultimatum: To return to 
Pakistan with him or to go her own way. Actually, Shahzad phrased this ultimatum as a 
fait accompli, because he called his wife, Huma, from the airport. He gave her no realistic 
chance at actually coming to Pakistan with him. Soon afterwards, Shahzad went to 
Pakistan while Huma went to Saudi Arabia with the two children she had from Shahzad. 
Shahzad himself went for terrorist training in the federally administered tribal areas 
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(FATA) of Pakistan. After several months in Pakistan, Shahzad returned to the United 
States in order to execute his planned bombing of Times Square. 
At some point after 2000 and before 2004, Shahzad become more active with 
other Muslims on campus, and by 2006 was a full-fledged participant on jihad-oriented 
Web boards.  This aspect of his life only became apparent later. The key document from 
this time was a long e-mail message that Shahzad wrote to such a board on the topic of 
jihad. This e-mail has been reproduced and coded in Table 8. Since the e-mail was quite 
long, only certain parts of it have been excerpted and coded. 
Table 9.   The E-Mail of Faisal Shahzad and Coding 
E-Mail Coding 
If something from what I wrote doesn't correspond 
with Quran and Sunnah then I renounce it and I ask 
Allah's forgiveness due to my ignorance… 
 
17 year old Mohammad bin Qasam attacked the 
Sub-continent Pak-o-Hind and defeated infidel 
ruler Raja Dahir because there came to him news 
of a Muslim women who was raped!!! and today 
our beloved Prophet (Katimun Nabieen 
Mohammad al-Ameen) PBUH has been 
disrespected and disgraced in the whole world and 
we just sit and watch with shame and sorrow and 
most of us don't even care… 
 
He blesses us with many blessing and every time 
we thank God but do not follow His teachings. 
And if He tests us with hard time our heart 
hardened with bitterness towards Him rather than 
humiliating and starts questioning and blaming 
Allah… 
 
Why do you have to follow Democracy (Human 
made Laws) if you're already given Laws revealed 
from Allah, Quran and Sunnah. Khilafath is what 
we Muslim ruled the world with, weren't we 
successful in world then? America, the source of 
democracy let's Pakistan rule by dictatorship?? 





Historical, political, and 





Is Shahzad also referring to his 
own “testing”? 
 
Ambiguity: Pain is also from God. 
 
Ambiguity: Choice between human 
and divine law. 
 
Ambiguity: Why are followers of 
the one true religion so weak and 
powerless, even in their own 
countries? 
 
An explanation for weakness. 
 
One way out of weakness: Making 
a statement about jihad.  
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E-Mail Coding 
My beloved and peaceful Ummah majority of us 
think that we are too weak against the west or 
foreign forces… Where will the help from God 
come if you were of equal power?... Does your 
heart still pumps or is it dead? 
 
The psychosocial perspective on Shahzad‘s radicalization does not claim to be 
able to detect whether Shahzad became radicalized because of ideological or theological 
reasons, or possibly simply out of frustration at the life he was living. However, the 
psychosocial perspective is a very useful means of locating the multiple psychic conflicts 
in Shahzad‘s life and following them through to Shahzad‘s inability to reach resolution.  
Table 9 demonstrates a prism of psychosocial trajectories. 
Table 10.   Overall Psychosocial Coding of Shahzad‘s Experiences 
Psychosocial Principle Themes Resolution v. Turbulence 
First psychosocial principle: 
Terrorism must not be seen 
as a syndrome but as a 
method of social and 
political influence. 
 
The desire to exert social 
and political influence can 
become great in individuals 
who feel what Shahzad‘s e-
mail called weakness. 
 
Shahzad tried to be strong 
but failed: His career 
advancement stalled, he 
married a woman not of his 
choosing, and he remained 
the youngest son of a very 
powerful father. 
 
Second principle: The 
attributes of terrorists are 
shaped by processes of 
social interaction.  
 
Shahzad began to interact 
with like-minded radicals. 
 
Radicals gave Shahzad an 
echo chamber and perhaps a 
way to deflect his 
frustration against life in 
America into a hatred of 
America itself, but not a 
way to be ‗strong.‘  
 
Third principle: Terrorist 
organizations can be 
analyzed by analogy with 
other social movements. 
 
Shahzad linked his own 
jihad to historical and 
theological themes in 
Islamic history. 
 
Shahzad contrasted the 
strength of classic jihadis 
with the weakness of 
current Muslims. 
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Psychosocial Principle Themes Resolution v. Turbulence 
Fifth principle: The decision 
to begin and sustain a 
terrorist campaign is always 
legitimized by an extreme 
ideology. 
 
Shahzad located what he 
considered an Islamist 
ideology to justify jihadi 
terrorism. 
 
Shahzad could not resolve 
the paradox of why even 
jihadis failed; why did 
God‘s help never seem to 
come? 
Sixth principle: Every 
terrorist campaign involves 
strategic goals but the 
rationality which terrorists 
apply to their violence is 
imperfect. 
 
Shahzad wanted to express 
his strength by striking a 
blow at the symbolic heart 
of American life. 
 
No conflict; in framing this 
act, Shahzad was providing 
the very assurance and help 
from God that did not, as he 
claimed in his e-mail, ever 
flow to passive people. 
Table 9 demonstrates how, at each stage of the radicalization process, Shahzad 
was faced with a psychic ambiguity that could not be resolved. Shahzad was not able to 
embrace one perspective or the other: He simultaneously saw and appreciated the full 
weakness of Muslims, yet he believed wholeheartedly that Muslims were promised help 
by God and deserved to rule the world. He understood his own failure while having 
wanted success. He was aware of the success of early jihadis while cognizant of the 
failure of the current generation of jihadis (and Muslims in general). All of these 
ambiguities were particularly intense because they mirrored Shahzad‘s own psychosocial 
state. As someone caught between success (such as that of his family) and great weakness 
(such as the mounting of his U.S. debts and inability to achieve much professionally, 
leading to the foreclosure of his home), Shahzad may have projected some of the psychic 
pain generated by his own state into a larger psychodrama involving the stage of 
jihadism. Regardless of how this process took place, or whether one aspect of it (such as 
theology) was stronger than other, what matters from the psychosocial perspective is that 
Jihad could only achieve what Rosenberg (1960) considered closure by violently 
asserting his feeling that victory belonged to him / the Muslims / God as a way of fighting 
against his knowledge that he had lost in life, his coreligionists were weak and 
downfallen, and the help promised by his God had not come. In this way, Shahzad finally 
ended the clash between feelings and thoughts that, according to Rosenberg, is the 
beginning of ambiguity and psychic pain.     
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B. ADAM GADAHN 
An excellent introduction to the radicalization process of Adahm Gadahn, the 
young Californian who now works as a radio propagandist for Al Qaeda based in 
Pakistan, is through his own conversion story, posted at: 
Table 11.   Adam Gadahn‘s Conversion Story and Coding 
Conversion Story Coding 
My first seventeen years have been a bit 
different than the youth experienced by 
most Americans. I grew up on an extremely 
rural goat ranch in Western Riverside 
County, California, where my family raises 
on average 150 to 200 animals for milk, 
cheese, and meat. My father is a halal 
butcher [a butcher who slaughters in an 
Islamic manner -ed.] and supplies to an 
Islamic Food Mart a few blocks from the 
Islamic Center in downtown Los Angeles.  
 
My father was raised agnostic or atheist, 
but he became a believer in One God when 
he picked up a Bible left on the beach. He 
once had a number of Muslim friends, but 
they‘ve all moved out of California now. 
My mother was raised Catholic, so she 
leans towards Christianity (although she, 
like my father, disregards the Trinity). I and 
my siblings were/are home-schooled, and 
as you may know, most home-school 
families are Christian. In the last 8 or so 
years, we have been involved with some 
home-schooling support groups, thus 
acquainting me with fundamentalist 
Christianity. It was an eye-opening 
experience. Setting aside the blind 
dogmatism and charismatic wackiness, it 
was quite a shock to me when I realized 
that these people, in their prayers, were 
actually praying TO JESUS. You see, I had 
always believed that Jesus (pbuh) was, at 
the very most, the Son of God (since that is 
what the Bible mistranslates ―Servant of 
 













Gadahn locates theological points in 
common between Islam and his parents‟ 










“Blind dogmatism and charismatic 
wackiness” as possible projection of 






Questions rationality of Christian belief as 
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Conversion Story Coding 
God‖ as). As I learned that belief in the 
Trinity, something I find absolutely 
ridiculous, is considered by most Christians 
to be a prerequisite for salvation, I 
gradually realized I could not be a 
Christian.  
 
In the meantime, I had become obsessed 
with demonic Heavy Metal music, 
something the rest of my family (as I now 
realize, rightfully so) was not happy with. 
My entire life was focused on expanding 
my music collection. I eschewed personal 
cleanliness and let my room reach an 
unbelievable state of disarray. My 
relationship with my parents became 
strained, although only intermittently so. I 
am sorry even as I write this.  
 
Earlier this year, I began to listen to the 
apocalyptic ramblings of Christian radio‘s 
―prophecy experts.‖ Their paranoid 
espousal of various conspiracy theories, 
rabid support of Israel and religious 
Zionism, and fiery preaching about the 
―Islamic Threat‖ held for me a strange 
fascination. Why? Well, I suppose it was 
simply the need I was feeling to fill that 
void I had created for myself. In any case, I 
soon found that the beliefs these 
evangelists held, such as Original Sin and 
the Infallibility of ―God‘s Word‖, were not 
in agreement with my theological ideas 
(not to mention the Bible) and I began to 
look for something else to hold onto.  
 
The turning point, perhaps, was when I 
moved in with my grandparents here in 
Santa Ana, the county seat of Orange, 
California. My grandmother, a computer 
whiz, is hooked up to America Online and I 
have been scooting the information 
superhighway since January. But when I 
moved in, with the intent of finding a job 



















“Strange fascination” with Islam: Does 






















Rational bases for attraction to Islam. 
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Conversion Story Coding 
(easier said than done), I begin to visit the 
religion folders on AOL and the Usenet 
newsgroups, where I found discussions on 
Islam to be the most intriguing. You see, I 
discovered that the beliefs and practices of 
this religion fit my personal theology and 
intellect as well as basic human logic. 
Islam presents God not as an 
anthropomorphic being but as an entity 
beyond human comprehension, 
transcendent of man, independant and 
undivided. Islam has a holy book that is 
comprehensible to a layman, and there is 
no papacy or priesthood that is considered 
infallible in matters of interpretation: all 
Muslims are free to reflect and interpret the 
book given a sufficient education. Islam 
does not believe that all men are doomed to 
Hell unless they simply accept that God 
(apparently unable to forgive otherwise) 
magnanimously allowed Himself to be 
tortured on a cross to enable Him to forgive 
all human beings who just believe that He 
allowed Himself to be tortured on a cross… 
Islam does not believe in a Chosen Race. 
And on and on…  
 
As I began reading English translations of 
the Qur‘an, I became more and more 
convinced of the truth and authenticity of 
Allah‘s teachings contained in those 114 
chapters. Having been around Muslims in 
my formative years, I knew well that they 
were not the bloodthirsty, barbaric 
terrorists that the news media and the 
televangelists paint them to be. Perhaps this 
knowledge led me to continue my personal 
research further than another person would 
have. I can‘t say when I actually decided 
that Islam was for me. It was really a 
natural progression. In any case, last week 
[November 1995 -ed.]I went to the Islamic 
Society of Orange County in Garden Grove 




















Gadahn believes that Muslims are not 
terrorists, yet he would soon become a 















What was the gateway from this fairly 
common conversion theme to an embrace 
of radicalization? 
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Conversion Story Coding 
I wanted to be a Muslim. He gave me some 
excellent reading material, and last Friday I 
took Shahada [accepted the creed of Islam -
ed.]in front of a packed masjid. I have 
spent this week learning to perform Salat 
and reflecting on the greatness of Allah. It 
feels great to be a Muslim! Subhaana 
rabbiyal ‗azeem!  
 
The story of Adam Gadahn presents several parallels and counterpoints to that of 
Faisal Shahzad. Both of the narratives can be understood through the framework of the 
psychosocial approach to terrorism. For example, in Gadahn‘s case, there is the same 
sense of drifting that characterized Shahzad. Both men drifted until they found (or, in 
Shahzad‘s case, re-found) Islam. For Gadahn, meeting Muslims offered him certainty in a 
life that had been characterized by a sort of wandering from agnosticism to Christianity to 
death metal. Gadahn occupied a sort of in-between space in which he has neither part of, 
nor excluded from, the mainstream psychosocial currents of American life. He lived on 
the fringes: On a farm, among parents of Jewish and Christian background who had no 
firm religion, without any notion of who or what he was or wanted to be. When Gadahn 
encountered Islam, he encountered certainty—not merely certainty in terms of the 
religious text, but also certainty in the persons of the Muslims whom he met. This 
certainty was also the same certainty that Shahzad had so deeply craved in his e-mail 
message to the Muslim online group. 
Ironically, Gadahn‘s conversion story—written before he became affiliated with 
Al Qaeda—carries the seeds of an explanation of his own radicalization. Gadahn 
critiques Christians for dogmatism and susceptibility to charisma, but it was precisely this 
combination of vulnerabilities that stuck Gadahn in 2006, when he came under the sway 
of Pakistani Muslim fundamentalists in Orange Country, California and decided to leave 
for terrorist training in Pakistan. While Gadahn has not documented this aspect of his 
radicalization, his conversion story leaves the all-important clues. Islam brought Gadahn 
a certainty that he was willing to pursue all the way to the end, and in encountering this 
certainty—which was propped up by fellow jihadis and consonant with Gadahn‘s own 
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search for meaning—he lost contact with all his previous concepts of nuance, 
compromise, and skepticism. Thus psychically emptied out, Gadahn was easy prey for 
charismatic, dogmatic figures who could promise him the certainty that had been missing 
from his whole life to date. 
Table 12.   Overall Psychosocial Coding of Gadahn‘s Experiences 
Psychosocial Principle Themes Resolution v. Turbulence 
First psychosocial principle: 
Terrorism must not be seen 
as a syndrome but as a 
method of social and 
political influence. 
 
The desire to exert social 
and political influence can 
become great in individuals 
who feel either weak or, as 
Gadahn was, alienated. 
 
Gadahn gave in to the 
influence of powerful 
mentors who had a social 
and political influence, and 
certainty, that he lacked and 
that was missing from his 
life. 
 
Second principle: The 
attributes of terrorists are 
shaped by processes of 
social interaction.  
Gadahn began to interact 
with like-minded radicals. 
 
Gadahn‘s persona was 
formed online and in the 
mosques. 
 
Third principle: Terrorist 
organizations can be 
analyzed by analogy with 
other social movements. 
 
Gadahn may have seen 
jihadism as just another 
kind of death metal; 
another stop in his search 
for extreme experience. 
 
Gadahn never reconciled the 
theological strength of Islam 
with its current weakness, except 
by referring to a future in which 
Islam also become strong in the 
world. 
Fifth principle: The 
decision to begin and 
sustain a terrorist 
campaign is always 
legitimized by an extreme 
ideology. 
 
Gadahn embraced the 
religion first, ideology 
second. 
 
Gadahn omitted completely to 
examine the contradictions 
between Islamic law and jihadi 
practice; his resolution is based 
in willful ignorance. 
Sixth principle: Every 
terrorist campaign 
involves strategic goals 
but the rationality which 
terrorists apply to their 
violence is imperfect. 
 
Gadahn‘s radio 
broadcasts have had no 
measurable effect on the 
success of his cause, but 
he still sees them as 
important. 
 
Again, Gadahn‘s refusal to ever 
acknowledge tactical or strategic 
failure indicates that he is less 
conflicted than Shahzad. 
One theme that is important in the coding of Gadahn‘s experiences in distinction 
to those of Shahzad is that Gadahn found more resolution than Shahzad did, which might 
explain why Gadahn is still a radio personality rather than a jihadi in the field. Shahzad 
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struggled mightily with contradictions that he saw, for example the contradiction between 
God‘s promise of help and success to the believers and the reality of a weak and 
fragmented Muslim world. Shahzad also struggled, on a more personal level, between his 
ambitions and his achievements, which never quite aligned. Thus, Shahzad‘s act of power 
was to assert violence over the American state that had, in his mind, denied opportunity 
and power to both him and Muslim states.   
Interestingly, Gadahn has never tried to exert the same kind of power. He has not 
been associated with any direct jihadi action and is best known for making radio 
broadcasts. It may be that the best way to explain the difference between Gadahn and 
Shahzad in this respect is that Gadahn has found a way to live in peace with some beliefs 
that, for Shahzad, were difficult to sustain. For Shahzad, the only way to reconcile the 
knowledge of his and Islam‘s weakness with his knowledge that the Qur‘an promised 
strength was to try to exert power on his own. Gadahn has had an easier time living with 
contradictions, perhaps because he does not process them in the same way as Shahzad. 
For example, Gadahn, like Comical Ali of the Saddam Hussein era, genuinely believes 
that his side is winning, no matter what is actually taking place in the world. Those, for 
example, Gadahn could portray the Malik mass shooting as a tactical victory on par with 
the defeat of an entire army. 
There is room in this analysis for the conclusion that, between the two, Shahzad is 
saner, as his act of jihadism was in its way a means to reconcile the psychic pain of 
holding contradictory beliefs. Gadahn appears to be an expert massager of his own 
beliefs, thus never having to face Shahzad‘s torment or having to engage in an actual 




Psychosocial explanations of phenomena do not pre-empt political, historical, or 
theological explanations. However, what psychosocial explanations do is call more 
attention to the internal filters of human behavior, specifically the feelings of the 
individual and the characteristics of the culture and society around that individual. 
Psychological explanations de-emphasize phenomena that take place ―out there,‖ in an 
abstract realm of politics or history, and draw them back into an internal frame of 
reference. In this sense, the psychosocial method of analysis has been very successful in 
terms of explaining data that would otherwise be aberrant or difficult to classify.   
For example, how are researchers to explain the fact that suicide terrorism has so 
far been a preferred method only for jihadis, and not terrorists from other religious 
denominations? To date, many explanations of this observed empirical fact have focused 
on explanations of phenomena ―out there,‖ specifically the history and theology of Islam. 
It is certainly true that jihadis have themselves called attention to the importance of these 
external phenomena in explaining their own internal frame of mind (see for example the 
jihadi testimonies in Gerges, 2006 or any transcripts of the sayings of Bin Laden, 2005). 
However, this pillar of explanation can be complemented or, depending on the vision of 
the analyst, replaced by an understanding of homegrown jihadism in particular as a 
psychosocial response to feared identity loss?     
The case studies discussed in this study have offered multiple insights into the 
lives of homegrown jihadis before and during the critical moments of radicalization. The 
coding of these cases demonstrated the existence of a host of psychosocial constructs 
underlying radicalization, including but not limited to questions of sexual identity, 
communal identity, anxieties related to cultural loss or assimilation, manhood, belonging, 
bravery, and meaning.  
The historical and political grievances of jihadis are shared by millions of jihadis, 
who do not employ suicide tactics. Thus, any theory of jihadi radicalization should at 
least try to explain what makes the trajectory of behavior among them so unique. Here, I 
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advanced a psychosocial theory that drew closely on both Rosenberg (1960) and 
Festinger (1956), two authorities in social psychology whose constructs have been found 
valid in many studies. Both Rosenberg and Festinger predicted that a person who lives 
with a divided self will work hard to either re-integrate the selves or else to keep them 
separate through self-delusion. Rosenberg and Festinger suggested that, for most people, 
constant self-delusion or re-integration is possible, but a handful of people will lack the 
ability either to heal their conflicting selves or to go on lying to themselves. These are the 
people who are likeliest to take violence action to try to align all of the conflict parts of 
their world. 
In this sense, perhaps the most significant contribution of this study is the idea 
that the suicide bombing is an essentially selfish act based on psychosocial personality 
integration. To date, the suicide attack has been studied almost exclusively for its tactical 
and strategic resonance (see for example Pape, 2006). I concede that the suicide attack is 
a tool of warfare, but I hotly contest the conclusion that what matters more to the jihad is 
the war ―out there‖; what matters more is the war ―in here,‖ the one in which he can use 
the suicide attacks as a means of addressing the various ailments of the psychosocial self. 
The suicide bombing is thus the perfect resolution, the book-end, to the process of jihadi 
radicalization because it gives the jihadi what he has wanted all along: Certainty, 
integration, and conclusion. 
What, then, is the significance of these findings for those who encounter the jihadi 
personality in situ or those who must fight the mature jihadi? In terms of counselors, 
clerics, and others who encountered the pre-radical jihadi, the first recommendation is to 
keep a close eye on young men who are at once sexually awkward or confused and also 
deeply enamored of Islam. One or the other of these predictors is not enough; both have 
to be present, and in some way clashing with each other, to predict the formation of the 
jihadi personality. If early signs are mixed, the next sign of a jihadi will be that of a 
Muslim man who begins to pull away from women: A devout Muslim man who gets 
divorced, becomes estranged from his wife, or leaves a girlfriend is going through one of 
the necessary psychosocial stages that the jihadi organization will later act upon and  
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exploit. By the same token, a Muslim man, who is devout but who also engages in 
violence against (rather than merely aversion from) women, is also giving notice of a 
misogyny that can be part of the maturing jihadi personality. 
What can be done to counteract the chance that Muslim men of this kind will 
become active jihadis? There are only two options. The first is to encourage Muslim men 
to embrace their Islamic identity over and above their own sexual leanings.  This solution 
will likely be preferred by Muslim religious authorities, but it is a dangerous and 
incomplete solution. There is always a chance that the attempt at suppression will fail, 
leading the potential jihadi into an even more aggressive effort to reconcile the two 
halves of his personality, which would lead once more to radicalization. The second 
solution is to encourage the potential jihadi to explore and embrace his sexuality. This 
solution suffers from the lack of a framework. Currently, the only Muslim association 
that institutionally supports homosexual Muslims is Al-Fatiha, which is not widely 
distributed on college campuses and American cities in general. The only other option is 
for young Muslim men to explore denominational LGBT support groups, but cultural 
caps could make this kind of interaction difficult. There is still a great deal of work to be 
done in creating a culturally- and theologically-grounded apparatus that can assist 
Muslims (whether men or not) in the exploration of sexual identities. The absence of such 
an apparatus will inevitably lead to the production of more jihadis. 
In terms of warfare itself, the most important realization is that the jihadi, over 
time, will pick any target. There is no particular logic in targeting because, as I have 
argued, the point is to achieve personality re-integration through death, not to achieve any 
particular aim. The aims, however they are articulated, are hollow; the anger comes from 
inside, from the jihadi‘s knowledge of his deeply divided self and not from any external 
observation of historical or political facts. This conclusion has important implications. 
First, at the level of grand strategy, it really is true that no actions taken by America or 
any country plagued by jihadi violence at home or abroad, are likely to reduce jihadism 
itself. The swamp cannot be drained because the swamp is generated by the internal 
psychic conflicts of jihadis, which cannot be managed or curtailed by war or police 
action. Second, at the level of both strategy and tactics, it is folly of the most inexcusable 
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and avoidable kind to afford jihadis military targets. In the absence of American military 
targets, jihadis will blow up anything—mosques, school buses, markets—regardless of 
what consequences these acts will have on the hearts and minds of society because the 
goal is not the rational application of strategy but the solution of the jihadi‘s internal 
psychic pain. Thus, the best strategy when confronted with jihadi suicide bombers is 
simply to retreat and to allow the jihadis to alienate their own communities, as they will 
inevitably do, by blowing up local targets.  
However, even this solution is not ideal. Social pressure can in some ways reduce 
the physical flow of jihadis (for example, to madrassahs), but it cannot achieve the root 
task of psyche reintegration that would make radicalization truly impossible. This task 
can only be accomplished, I contend, with a psychosocial revolution, in particular one 
that gives young Muslim men who a socially acceptable and popularly accepted way to 
integrate the broken parts of their psyches. Such an apparatus already exists for Jews and 
Christians. It is, however, inchoate in the Muslim world, which has not formally defined 
jihadism as a therapeutic problem that requires attention from professionals, 
communities, and volunteers. Ironically, then, the best way to fight jihadi violence is not 
through military but through social means—not in terms of social engineering, but in 
both tacit and overt support to existing Muslim social and therapeutic movements more 
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